Verifier IAM authentication compatibility
Verifier IAM authentication compatibility
Issue272, owner-directed implementation2026-10-23; proposed sensitive-source review before migration/application. Migration30 remains immutable.
Evidence and decision
Read-only hosted role metadata showed the verifier login and NOLOGIN capability have safe attributes and the operator can SET bookkeeping_owner. The login's only membership is cloudsqliamserviceaccount, ADMIN false, INHERIT true, SET true. The blanket SET-membership rejection therefore prevents bootstrap before grants. No financial records were read and no authority persisted from the rejection.
Selected official sections reviewed2026-10-23:
- Google Cloud SQL users, System users and roles: cloudsqliamserviceaccount designates IAM service-account authentication; system roles cannot be modified/deleted or assigned by customers (except the documented cloudsqlsuperuser assignment). Vendor implementation guidance, not an accounting standard; actual instance metadata separately establishes this membership's options.
- PostgreSQL17 SET ROLE, Description and Notes: SET membership permits assuming the target role; INHERIT grants its effective privileges without switching. Selected sections, not the entire manual.
Decision: allow SET only for the exact login-to-cloudsqliamserviceaccount edge, ADMIN false and INHERIT true, with a safe NOLOGIN marker having no parent-role memberships. Every other SET/ADMIN edge remains rejected, including capability memberships and alternate grantors. The existing effective database/schema/ table/column/sequence/function checks still cover the marker through inheritance. Marker ownership and unsafe attributes must not open an authority path. Explicit SET marker execution still cannot invoke verification: existing entrypoints require the original session identity and role NONE. No marker role is created, modified or granted by bootstrap; local synthetic tests supply the simulation.
Alternative: alter/remove Google's marker membership. Rejected because it changes managed authentication and conflicts with the documented system-role boundary. Alternative: allow all cloudsql roles or all SET edges. Rejected: broadens authority. Inference: this narrowly inspected marker is compatible with restricted execution; its name alone is insufficient. Unexpected privileges or role topology still fail.
Standards and acceptance
This is internal database authorization, with no financial message/data mapping. ISO20022/4217 and ISO21378 mappings are unchanged by this slice; no applicable financial message identifier is invented. Existing verifier financial semantics and multicurrency requirements remain unchanged; no ISO conformance claim.
Forward migration31 replaces only integration.verifier_login; signature, ownership and existing EXECUTE ACL remain intact. Down restores the previous predicate; live down-migration is not an approved rollout. Bootstrap mirrors the narrow preliminary exception and retains the complete final predicate check.
Acceptance: migration-test, ledger-test, sandbox-verification-test and verifier-bootstrap-test on disposable PostgreSQL17; safe marker bootstrap/replay and actual login succeed, while marker ADMIN, NOINHERIT, unsafe attributes, parent roles, effective financial/column/function authority, unrelated SET edges, and direct capability SET remain denied. SET marker does not authorize comparison. Core check/test/build plus exact-head CI remain required. Human security review, trusted rebuilt migration image, approved finite release and hosted retry are separate gates; no hosted PASS or mandate follows from source tests.