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justin-napolitano/jayburd-bookkeeping / docs/contracts/webhook-iam-compatibility.md

Webhook managed IAM compatibility — #378

Synced 2026-11-04 · Updates are made in the source repository.

Webhook managed IAM compatibility — #378

Observed2026-11-01: approved Production bootstrap rolled back with webhook_bootstrap_rejected. Read-only catalog metadata showed safe intended login/capability flags, denied Sandbox CONNECT and owner SET; the login's cloudsqliamserviceaccount edge had ADMIN=false/SET=true. No grant persisted.

Re-reviewed Google Cloud SQL users, System users and roles: https://docs.cloud.google.com/sql/docs/postgres/users#cloud_sql_system_users_and_roles and PostgreSQL17 SET ROLE Description/Notes: https://www.postgresql.org/docs/17/sql-set-role.html . Selected sections only, 2026-11-01; the vendor describes the managed marker and prohibits customer modification; hosted catalog metadata supplies actual membership options. The prior verifier decision and migration31 are the local precedent, not a blanket exception for all Cloud SQL roles.

Decision: both operator webhook bootstraps permit SET only for the exact login's inherited, ADMIN=false, safe NOLOGIN cloudsqliamserviceaccount marker with no parent memberships. Every other SET/ADMIN edge still denies. Effective database, schema, table, column, sequence and function checks cover inherited authority; column checks are explicit so a marker cannot hide column-only access. Direct ACL, predefined role, exact target/profile and Production cross-database checks remain. No managed role/membership is modified or granted. No migration or runtime image change; independently qualified image source remains1eec1f0.

Alternatives: removing Google's membership violates its managed-role boundary; allowing all SET edges would admit privilege escalation. A named role alone is insufficient. STRIDE elevation(high): exact topology/attributes plus effective ACL denials; replay(high): existing immutable ingress profile/receipt/current-state checks; disclosure(high): metadata-only diagnostics, no payload/secret inspection.

Internal authorization only: ISO20022/4217/21378 mapping and financial semantics unchanged; no new financial message identifier or conformance claim. Synthetic PG17 tests must prove safe marker initial/replay and runtime capability while rejecting ADMIN, NOINHERIT, LOGIN/unsafe attributes, parents, unrelated/capability SET and inherited table/column/function authority. Existing bootstrap/SQL/core checks and exact-head CI required. Human security review before merge/apply; actual fixed bootstrap/readback remains375, not a synthetic success claim.